Parliament bill

Public Service Amendment Bill

Royal assent · Introduced by Hon Paul Goldsmith · National Party

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What this bill does

The bill passed its third reading 67–55; the vote was not unanimous. According to the Government’s stated rationale, the Public Service needs a clearer focus on delivering efficient, high-quality services and value for New Zealanders. The bill aims to focus the Public Service on supporting the Government’s policies, service delivery, constitutional government, and lawful conduct. The bill rewrites the public service purpose and sets detailed responsibilities for department chief executives, including advice, implementing lawful ministerial instructions, delivery, stewardship, integrity, and cross-agency work. It also gives the Public Service Commissioner greater roles in chief executive performance, designated key positions, misconduct oversight, and national-security vendor restrictions.

AI-assisted summary based on the bill text and linked Hansard debates.

Latest voting result

May 27, 2026
Third reading: Passed Party vote

Ayes 67 · Noes 55

  • National Party Aye · 48 votes
  • ACT Party Aye · 11 votes
  • NZ First Party Aye · 8 votes
  • Labour Party No · 34 votes
  • Green Party No · 15 votes
  • Te Pāti Māori No · 4 votes
  • Ferris, Tākuta No
  • Kapa-Kingi, Mariameno No

View the vote in Hansard

Arguments raised in Parliament

AI-assisted summary of the linked Hansard debates. Each point is grounded in the cited transcript.

Arguments for

For public-service chief executives, mandatory contestable reappointment processes are claimed to broaden the talent pool and secure the best-qualified leaders rather than automatic incumbents.

For Ministers and the public, requiring the Commissioner to publish chief-executive performance-review frameworks and consult on expectations is claimed to make performance management more robust and transparent.

For the Public Service and Parliament, replacing 34 agency long-term insights briefings with a DPMC briefing is claimed to eliminate overlapping work while concentrating long-term thinking and scrutiny.

For public-sector agencies, empowering the Commissioner to restrict specified products, services, or vendors is claimed to prevent malicious or disruptive actors from threatening national security or national interests.

Arguments against

For Parliament and the public, centralising long-term insights briefings at DPMC is argued to stop agency-specific papers being published and considered by select committees, reducing scrutiny and long-term strategic thinking.

For the Public Service workforce and the communities it serves, removing diversity and inclusion requirements is argued to reduce workforce diversity and weaken people’s ability to see themselves represented.

For the Prime Minister’s Advisory Group, fixed-term contracts are argued to reduce job security and make staff more likely to offer political rather than free and frank advice.

Nuance and qualifications

A single DPMC long-term insights briefing could add value by connecting agency issues, but DPMC should consult agencies widely and preserve issues that need public and parliamentary attention.

The bill’s requirement to take public-service chief-executive appointments to the market raises a consistency concern because a contemporaneous local-government bill would instead allow extended reappointments without going to market.

Bill text

Public Service Amendment Bill

Version published November 27, 2025 00:00.

Public Service Amendment Bill The Parliament of New Zealand enacts as follows: 1 Title This Act is the Public Service Amendment Act 2025 . 2 Commencement This Act comes into force on the day after Royal assent. 3 Principal Act This Part amends the Public Service Act 2020. 4 Section 3 amended (Purposes of this Act) In section 3(e),— a delete fundamental characteristic of the ; and b replace is acting with acts . 5 Section 4 amended (Guide to this Act) In section 4(2),— a after purpose of the public service, , insert the principal responsibilities of chief executives, ; and b delete acting with a spirit of service to the community, . In section 4(4),— a replace Deputy Public Service Commissioners with Deputy Public Service Commissioner ; and b after provisions relating to , insert key positions in the public service, . 6 Section 5 amended (Interpretation) In section 5, definition of Deputy Commissioner , replace a Deputy Public Service Commissioner with the Deputy Public Service Commissioner . In section 5, definition of public service employee , paragraph (a), replace sections 13 and with section . In section 5, definition of public service leader , replace a Deputy Commissioner wi…
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Public Service Amendment Bill The Parliament of New Zealand enacts as follows: 1 Title This Act is the Public Service Amendment Act 2025 . 2 Commencement This Act comes into force on the day after Royal assent. 3 Principal Act This Part amends the Public Service Act 2020. 4 Section 3 amended (Purposes of this Act) In section 3(e),— a delete fundamental characteristic of the ; and b replace is acting with acts . 5 Section 4 amended (Guide to this Act) In section 4(2),— a after purpose of the public service, , insert the principal responsibilities of chief executives, ; and b delete acting with a spirit of service to the community, . In section 4(4),— a replace Deputy Public Service Commissioners with Deputy Public Service Commissioner ; and b after provisions relating to , insert key positions in the public service, . 6 Section 5 amended (Interpretation) In section 5, definition of Deputy Commissioner , replace a Deputy Public Service Commissioner with the Deputy Public Service Commissioner . In section 5, definition of public service employee , paragraph (a), replace sections 13 and with section . In section 5, definition of public service leader , replace a Deputy Commissioner with the Deputy Commissioner . 7 Subpart 2 heading in Part 1 replaced In Part 1, replace the subpart 2 heading with: 2 Public service defined, purpose of the public service, principal responsibilities of chief executives, and public service principles 8 Cross-heading above section 10 repealed Repeal the cross-heading above section 10. 9 Cross-heading above section 11 repealed Repeal the cross-heading above section 11. 10 Section 11 replaced (Purpose) Replace section 11 with: 11 Purpose of the public service The public service— a supports the Government to develop and implement its policies, deliver high-quality and efficient public services, and meet the needs of New Zealanders; and b supports constitutional and democratic government and acts with a spirit of service to the community and in accordance with the law. 11 New section 11A inserted (Principal responsibilities of chief executives of departments and departmental agencies) After section 11, insert: 11A Principal responsibilities of chief executives of departments and departmental agencies 1 A chief executive of a department or departmental agency is responsible to the appropriate Minister for— a giving advice to Ministers; and b implementing Ministers’ lawful instructions; and c the efficient and economical delivery of the goods or services provided by their agency, the performance of the regulatory functions for which their agency is responsible, and how effectively those goods, services, and regulatory functions contribute to intended outcomes; and d the performance of the functions and duties and the exercise of the powers of the chief executive or of their agency (whether those functions, duties, or powers are imposed or conferred by an enactment or by the policies of the Government); and e the operation of their agency, including in carrying out the purpose of the public service under section 11 ; and f the financial stewardship of their agency, including building and maintaining a financially literate workforce; and g working to improve inter-operability, co-ordination, and collaboration across public service agencies; and h the integrity and conduct of the employees for whom the chief executive is responsible; and i their agency’s responsiveness on matters relating to the collective interests of government; and j supporting that Minister to act as a good steward of the public interest, including by— i maintaining public institutions, assets, and liabilities; and ii maintaining the currency of any legislation administered by their agency; and iii providing advice on the long-term implications of policies. 2 The chief executive of a department is not responsible for the performance of functions or duties, or the exercise of powers, of or by that part of the department that is a departmental agency hosted by the department unless expressly provided in this Act or another enactment. 3 The chief executive of a departmental agency is responsible for the performance of functions and duties, and the exercise of powers, by that part of the department that is the departmental agency only and not any functions, duties, or powers of the host department unless expressly provided in this Act or another enactment. 4 The chief executive of a servicing department of an interdepartmental executive board is not responsible for the performance of functions or duties, or the exercise of powers, of or by the board unless provided in an enactment or delegated to the department under section 27 . 5 However, if the chief executive of a servicing department is also a member of the board, they also have full responsibilities as a member of the board. 12 Section 12 amended (Public service principles) Replace section 12(2) with: 2 Public service chief executives, boards of interdepartmental ventures, and interdepartmental executive boards are responsible for— a upholding the public service principles when carrying out their responsibilities and performing their functions; and b ensuring that any agencies they lead or perform some functions within also uphold the public service principles when carrying out their responsibilities and performing their functions. Repeal section 12(3) and (4). In section 12(5), replace subsections (2) to (4) with subsection (2) . 13 Section 13 repealed (Spirit of service to community) Repeal section 13. 14 Section 17 amended (Commissioner may set minimum standards of integrity and conduct) In the heading to section 17, replace may with must . Replace section 17(1) with: 1 The Commissioner must set minimum standards of integrity and conduct . relating to— a the public service principles; and b the public service values. 1A The Commissioner may set minimum standards of integrity and conduct may include standards relating to other matters consistent with section 11 . — a the public service principles: b the public service values. 15 Section 19 amended (Guidance on integrity and conduct) In section 19(1), replace agencies referred to in section 17(2) with agencies in the State services (except Crown Research Institutes and their subsidiaries) . 16 Section 24 amended (Functions, duties, and powers and working arrangements of departmental agencies) In section 24(6), replace section 52(2) and (3) , which relates to with section 11A(2) and (3) , which relates to . 17 Section 26 amended (Establishment and reorganisations of interdepartmental executive boards) After section 26(1)(c), insert: d if the date on which the board is to be disestablished is changed, amend the date on which the board is to be disestablished and the item in Part 3 of Schedule 2 relating to that board is consequentially repealed. Replace section 26(2)(d) with: d specify the date on which the board is to be disestablished and the item in Part 3 of Schedule 2 relating to that board is consequentially repealed. 18 Section 27 amended (Responsibilities, powers, and working arrangements of interdepartmental executive boards) In section 27(1)(a), replace section 52(1) (relating to general responsibilities of chief executives) with section 11A(1) (relating to principal responsibilities of chief executives) . In section 27(3), replace section 52(4) and (5) , which relates to with section 11A(4) and (5) , which relate to . 19 Section 34 amended (Responsibilities and powers of boards of interdepartmental ventures) In section 34(a), replace section 52(1) (relating to general responsibilities of chief executives) with section 11A(1) (relating to principal responsibilities of chief executives) . 20 Cross-heading above section 42 amended In the cross-heading above section 42, replace Deputy Public Service Commissioners with Deputy Public Service Commissioner . 21 Section 44 amended (Commissioner’s general functions) In section 44(c), replace that reflects the diversity of the society it serves and to ensure fair and equitable employment, including by promoting with and to promote . 22 Section 45 amended (Duty to act independently when making decisions about public service chief executives) Replace section 45(1) and (2) with: When making decisions about individual chief executives, the Commissioner is not responsible to the Minister and must act independently, except as provided for in clauses 3, 6, 7, and 8 of Schedule 7 (relating to appointment, transfer, conditions of employment, and removal from office of chief executives). 23 Section 47 amended (Deputy Public Service Commissioners) Replace the heading to section 47 with Deputy Public Service Commissioner . In section 47(1), replace Two Deputy Public Service Commissioners with A Deputy Public Service Commissioner . In section 47(3) and (6), replace a Deputy Commissioner with the Deputy Commissioner . In section 47(4), replace either or both of the Deputy Commissioners with the Deputy Commissioner . In section 47(5), delete who has held the role longer . 24 Section 48 amended (Other terms and conditions of appointment in Schedule 4) In section 48, replace Deputy Commissioners with Deputy Commissioner . 25 Section 49 amended (Commissioner is chief executive of Commission) In section 49(2), replace a Deputy Commissioner with the Deputy Commissioner . Replace section 49(3) with: 3 The Deputy Commissioner retains their office as Deputy Commissioner despite any delegation of all or part of the chief executive’s role. 26 Section 51 amended (Public service chief executives) After section 51(3)(a), insert: aa if the date on which the functional chief executive role is to be disestablished is changed, amend the date on which the role is to be disestablished and the item in Schedule 5 relating to that role is consequentially repealed: Replace section 51(4)(d) with: d specify the date on which the functional chief executive role is to be disestablished and the item in Schedule 5 relating to that role is consequentially repealed. 27 Section 52 repealed (General responsibilities of chief executives of departments and departmental agencies) Repeal section 52. 28 Section 53 amended (Functional chief executives) In section 53(1), replace Section 52(1) with Section 11A(1) . 29 Section 54 amended (Duty to act independently in employment matters) In section 54(1), replace section 52(1) with section 11A(1) . Replace section 54(2) with: 2 The independence required by subsection (1) is subject to— a the requirements in section 55A(3) to (5) relating to key positions; and b the requirement in section 70(1) that a chief executive have regard to the wishes of the relevant Minister when making decisions about ministerial staff. 30 New section 55A and cross-heading inserted After section 55, insert: Key positions 55A Key positions in the public service 1 The Commissioner may, after consulting the chief executive of a department or the board of an interdepartmental venture, designate as a key position a position in the department or interdepartmental venture that meets the criteria in subsection (2) . 2 For the purposes of this section and section 54(2)(a) , key position means a position in a department or an interdepartmental venture that, in the opinion of the Commissioner, is key— a because it is critical to the performance of the public service; or b because of its potential to develop senior leaders. 3 The chief executive or the board may appoint an employee to a key position only with the Commissioner’s agreement. 4 The chief executive or the board must consult the Commissioner on the performance review of any employee appointed to a key position. 5 The chief executive or the board must notify the Commissioner of any intention to redesign, restructure, or otherwise change a key position. 6 The Commissioner must publish a list of key positions on an Internet site maintained by or on behalf of the Commission. 31 Section 59 amended (Public service leadership team) In section 59(b), replace 2 Deputy Commissioners with Deputy Commissioner . 32 New section 66A inserted (Public service employees: policy advisory group) After section 66, insert: 66A Public service employees: policy advisory group 1 In this section, policy advisory group means the group of advisers established within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet who provide advice directly to the Prime Minister about specific portfolios across the government. 2 The chief executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet may appoint employees to the policy advisory group on fixed-term employment agreements. 3 The following are each deemed to be a genuine reason for appointing employees to the policy advisory group on fixed-term employment agreements for the purposes of section 66(2)(a) of the Employment Relations Act 2000: a to enable periodic change in the composition of the policy advisory group for the purposes of developing leadership and advice capability in the public service: b to ensure that the policy advisory group comprises a complementary mix of advisory skills. 33 Section 68 amended (Public service employees: departmental agencies) Before section 68(1)(a)(i), insert: iaaa section 55A(3) to (5) (relating to key positions); and After section 68(1)(a)(vi), insert: via section 89A (application of collective agreements to employees following reorganisations); and vib sections 89B to 89E (application of employee and reorganisation provisions to transfers of functions between public service agencies and Crown entities); and vic section 94A (notification of misconduct or serious misconduct investigations); and Repeal section 68(1)(xii) and (xiii). 34 Section 73 amended (Chief executive of department and board of an interdepartmental venture to be good employer) Repeal section 73(2). Repeal section 73(3)(i) and (j). 35 Section 75 and cross-heading repealed Repeal section 75 and the cross-heading above section 75. 36 New cross-heading above section 86 inserted After section 85, insert: Transfer of employees between public service agencies and restrictions on redundancy payments 37 New sections 89A to 89E and cross-headings inserted After section 89, insert: Application of collective agreements to employees following reorganisations 89A Application of collective agreements to employees following reorganisations 1 This section limits which employees may be bound by a collective agreement that— a binds the chief executive or board of a department or an interdepartmental venture ( A ) before a transfer of functions from A to another department or interdepartmental venture ( B ) and that, as a consequence of clauses 2 and 3 of Schedule 9, binds the chief executive or board of B after that transfer of functions ( collective agreement A ); or b binds the chief executive or board of B before that transfer of functions ( collective agreement B ). 2 After that transfer of functions,— a the only employees of B who are entitled to be bound by or enforce collective agreement A are those employees who are appointed to a position as an employee in B that has been established (whether or not previously existing in A) to enable B to carry out the transferred functions; and b the only employees of B who are entitled to be bound by or enforce collective agreement B are those employees who hold, or are appointed to, a position as an employee other than a position referred to in paragraph (a) . 3 Subsection (2) does not bind an employee to a collective agreement, or entitle an employee to be bound by or enforce a collective agreement, if the employee would not otherwise be bound by, or be entitled to be bound by or enforce, that agreement. 4 This section limits which employees may be bound by collective agreements, and the coverage of those agreements, under sections 76 to 80 of this Act and sections 56(1), 57, 62(3), and 243 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. 5 This section does not apply to a collective agreement to the extent that the parties to the agreement agree otherwise. Application of employee and reorganisation provisions to transfer of functions between public service agencies and Crown entities 89B Application of employee and reorganisation provisions to transfers of functions between public service agencies and Crown entities This section and sections 89C to 89E apply to a transfer of functions from a Crown entity to a public service agency and to a transfer of functions from a public service agency to a Crown entity. 89C Restriction of redundancy payments Sections 88(1) and (3) and 89 apply— a as if— i a reference to a public service employee were a reference to an employee of a Crown entity, department, or interdepartmental venture; and ii a reference to the employee’s current department or interdepartmental venture were a reference to the employee’s current Crown entity, department, or interdepartmental venture; and b with all other necessary modifications. 89D Application of reorganisation provisions to collective agreements 1 The provisions specified in subsections (2) and (3) (relating to reorganisations) apply to the extent that— a those provisions relate to a collective agreement that binds the chief executive of a Crown entity or department or the board of an interdepartmental venture before the transfer of the functions; and b that collective agreement applies to an employee whose position in the Crown entity or department or interdepartmental venture ceases to exist as a result of the transfer of functions. 2 Clause 2(3) and (6) of Schedule 9 applies— a as if a reference to the public service agency whose functions have been transferred were a reference to the Crown entity or public service agency whose functions are being transferred; and b with all other necessary modifications. 3 Clause 3(3) of Schedule 9 applies— a as if a reference to the chief executive of the public service agency whose functions have been transferred were a reference to the board of the Crown entity, or the chief executive or board of the public service agency, whose functions have been transferred; and b with all other necessary modifications. 89E Application of collective agreements to employees following reorganisations 1 Section 89A applies to the extent that— a any collective agreement binds the chief executive of a Crown entity or department or the board of an interdepartmental venture before the transfer of the functions; and b that collective agreement applies to an employee whose position in the Crown entity or department or interdepartmental venture ceases to exist as a result of the transfer of functions. 2 Section 89A applies in respect of the Crown entity, department, or interdepartmental venture that functions are transferred from— a as if any reference to department or interdepartmental venture A in that section were a reference to that Crown entity or department or interdepartmental venture; and b with all other necessary modifications. 38 New sections 94A and 94B and cross-heading inserted After section 94, insert: Notifying and reporting on misconduct or serious misconduct investigations 94A Notification of misconduct or serious misconduct investigations 1 A chief executive of a department or the board of an interdepartmental venture must notify the Commissioner before commencing an investigation into allegations of misconduct or serious misconduct by a senior public service employee. 2 The Commissioner may provide oversight and advice to the chief executive or the board on the interpretation and application of standards and guidance relating to integrity and conduct. 3 In this section, senior public service employee means a public service employee who reports directly to the chief executive or the board. 94B Reporting on misconduct or serious misconduct investigations 1 This section applies to the agencies referred to in section 17(2) (excluding school boards). 2 Each agency must give a report to the Commissioner on the outcome of all investigations into alleged misconduct or serious misconduct by employees of the agency that have ceased or are concluded before the end of a financial year, as soon as practicable after the end of that financial year. 3 The Commissioner may issue guidance on this reporting, including the format. 4 The Commissioner must use this information to prepare and publish a report annually on an Internet site maintained by, or on behalf of, the Commission. 5 In this section, school board has the meaning given in section 7(1)(d) of the Crown Entities Act 2004. 39 Section 97 amended (Government workforce policy: content) Repeal section 97(2)(e). 40 Section 103 amended (Offence to solicit or attempt to influence public service leaders) In section 103(3)(a), replace a Deputy Commissioner with the Deputy Commissioner . 41 Section 104 amended (Immunity for chief executives and employees) In section 104(1), replace Public service chief executives, Deputy Commissioners, with The Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, public service chief executives, . After section 104(1), insert: 1A The immunity in subsection (1) applies to public service chief executives acting in any capacity under this Act or any other Act or otherwise. 42 Schedule 1 amended In Schedule 1 ,— a insert the Part set out in the Schedule of this Act as the last Part; and b make all necessary consequential amendments. 43 Schedule 3 amended In Schedule 3, after clause 2(2), insert: 3 The Commissioner may recover from the public service agency or host department the actual and reasonable costs incurred by the Commission in conducting an investigation or inquiry. In Schedule 3, in the heading to clause 4, after Power to , insert require information, question employees, and . In Schedule 3, repeal clause 4(1)(a). In Schedule 3, after clause 4(1)(c), insert: d enter the premises of a public service agency. In Schedule 3, after clause 4(2), insert: 2A A person has the same privileges as witnesses in courts of law when— a producing information, documents, and files; and b giving information or particulars; and c answering questions. In Schedule 3, repeal clause 4(4). In Schedule 3, after clause 5, insert: Performance improvement reviews 5A Power to conduct performance improvement review 1 This clause applies to— a the public service; and b Crown entities named in Schedule 1 of the Crown Entities Act 2004; and c the New Zealand Police, the New Zealand Defence Force, and the Parliamentary Counsel Office. 2 The Commissioner may conduct— a an agency performance improvement review with the agreement of the appropriate or responsible Minister; or b a system performance improvement review with the agreement of the Minister. 3 The Commissioner may recover from the agency or agencies, as applicable, the actual and reasonable costs incurred by the Commissioner in conducting the performance improvement review. 4 In this clause,— agency performance improvement review means an independent review of the performance of an agency, including the agency’s delivery of government priorities, core functions, and organisational management system performance improvement review means an independent review of the performance of a group of agencies, including how the agencies work together to deliver shared outcomes. Directions to manage risks to national interest and national security 5B Meaning of classified security information 1 In this schedule, unless the context otherwise requires, classified security information means information held by a specified agency that the head of the specified agency certifies in writing cannot be disclosed under this Act (except as expressly authorised by or under an Act or other rule of law) because— a the information is information of a kind specified in subclause (2) ; and b disclosure of the information would be disclosure of a kind specified in subclause (3) . 2 Information falls within subclause (1)(a) if it— a might lead to the identification, or provide details, of the source of the information, the nature, content, or scope of the information, or the nature or type of the assistance or operational methods available to the specified agency; or b is about particular operations that have been undertaken, or are being or are proposed to be undertaken, in pursuance of any of the functions of the specified agency; or c has been provided to the specified agency by the Government of another country, an agency of the Government of another country, or an international organisation, and is information that the specified agency cannot disclose because the Government, agency, or organisation that has provided the information will not consent to the disclosure. 3 Disclosure of information falls within subclause (1)(b) if the disclosure would be likely— a to prejudice the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of New Zealand; or b to prejudice the entrusting of information to the Government of New Zealand on a basis of confidence by the Government of another country, an agency of the Government of another country, or an international organisation; or c to prejudice the maintenance of the law, including the prevention, investigation, and detection of offences, and the right to a fair trial; or d to endanger the safety of any person. 4 In this schedule, in relation to classified security information,— head of the specified agency means, as applicable, the Director-General of Security, the Director-General of the Government Communications Security Bureau, the Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, or the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade specified agency means, as applicable, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, the Government Communications Security Bureau, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 5C Power to issue direction to manage risks to national security and national interest 1 The Commissioner may, if the Commissioner considers it necessary to manage risk to national security or the national interest, issue to 1 or more relevant agencies a direction to restrict (including prohibit) the use of a specified vendor, service, or product, or specified class of vendors, services, or products, by or within those agencies. 2 Classified security information may be relied on in making a decision to issue a direction under subclause (1) . 3 The Commissioner must, before issuing a direction under this clause,— a seek advice from public service chief executives, including— i the Director-General of Security, the Director-General of the Government Communications Security Bureau, and the Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, regarding risk to national security; and ii the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade, regarding New Zealand’s international obligations and relationships; and b consult the Minister. 4 In issuing a direction, the Commissioner must have regard to— a the nature and extent of the risk to national security and the nature and extent of the risk to the national interest; and b the principle that the direction should be proportional to the nature of the risk; and c the anticipated benefits to New Zealand from preventing, sufficiently mitigating, or removing the risk; and d New Zealand’s international obligations and relationships; and e the effect of the direction on the relevant agencies, or on the individuals working within those agencies, as users of the vendor, service, or product, or the class of vendors, services, or products; and f the effect that the direction may have on markets and trade; and g any other matters the Commissioner considers relevant. 5 An agency to which a direction issued under this clause applies must comply with the direction. 6 In this clause,— protective security requirements has the meaning given in section 4(1) of the Inspector-General of Defence Act 2023 relevant agency means— a a public service agency: b an agency directed to implement the protective security requirements. 5D Commissioner may issue guidance to State services The Commissioner may, if they issue a direction under clause 5C(1) , issue to 1 or more agencies in the State services guidance concerning the use, by or within those agencies, of the relevant specified vendor, service, or product, or specified class of vendors, services, or products. 5E Affected person must be notified of direction 1 In this clause, affected person means, in relation to a direction issued under clause 5C(1) , any of the following persons: a a vendor who is specified in the direction: b a provider of a service that is specified in the direction: c a manufacturer or a developer of a product that is specified in the direction. 2 This clause applies if a direction has been issued under clause 5C(1) and an affected person or a representative of an affected person is in New Zealand. 3 The Commissioner must, if practicable, give notice (in the prescribed form (if any)) to the affected person or their representative that the direction has been issued. 4 A notice under subclause (3) must be given as soon as practicable after the direction has been issued. 5 If the Commissioner relies on classified security information in making a decision to issue the direction, the notice given under subclause (3) must state that— a the Commissioner relied on that kind of information; and b the affected person may request a summary (a CSI summary ) of the classified security information. 6 The purpose of the CSI summary is to enable the affected person to have a sufficient understanding of— a the classified security information the Commissioner relied on in making the decision (without that information being disclosed to the affected person); and b the reasons for the decision based on that information. 7 If the affected person requests a CSI summary,— a the Commissioner and the head of the specified agency that holds the classified security information must agree on the contents of the summary; and b the Commissioner must provide the agreed summary to the affected person within a reasonable time. 8 However, the Commissioner may refuse to provide a CSI summary if the Commissioner and the head of the specified agency are satisfied that a summary that is sufficient to meet its purpose cannot be provided without disclosing classified security information. 5F Proceedings involving classified security information 1 This section applies to any civil proceedings (including public law and judicial review proceedings) in a court relating to a direction issued under clause 5C(1) . 2 If the Crown proposes to present classified security information in proceedings, the Attorney-General must— a make an application to an authorised court under section 32 of the 2022 Act for a security information order to protect the confidentiality of the information to be given as evidence in the proceedings; and b submit to the court the certification described in clause 5B(1) . 3 If the classified security information is also national security information, the Crown may submit with the application and certification referred to in subclause (2) an NSI certificate under section 41 of the 2022 Act and seek a security information order as set out in section 36(3) of that Act (under which the types of orders available to the court are limited). 4 In this section,— 2022 Act means the Security Information in Proceedings Act 2022 authorised court, national security information, NSI certificate, and security information order have the meanings set out in section 4 of the 2022 Act. In Schedule 3, replace clause 6(3)(d) with: d the powers under clause 5C (relating to issuing a direction to manage risk to national security and the national interest); or da the powers under clause 3 of Schedule 7 (relating to the appointment of public service chief executives); or In Schedule 3, repeal clause 16(4)(a)(v). 44 Schedule 4 amended In the Schedule 4 heading, replace Deputy Commissioners with Deputy Commissioner . In Schedule 4, clause 1(1), replace the 2 Deputy Commissioners with Deputy Commissioner . In Schedule 4, clauses 1(2) and (3), 2(1), 4(1) and (2), and 5(1) and (2), replace a Deputy Commissioner with Deputy Commissioner . In Schedule 4, clause 2(2), replace a Deputy Commissioner with the Deputy Commissioner . In Schedule 4, clause 3(1), replace Deputy Commissioners with Deputy Commissioner . In Schedule 4, clause 6(1), replace a Deputy Commissioner with the Deputy Commissioner in each place. In Schedule 4, clause 6(2), replace a Deputy Commissioner with the Deputy Commissioner . 45 Schedule 6 amended In Schedule 6, replace clause 2(4)(c) with: c an individual working in the public service as one of the following in relation to a function of the public service: i a secondee from elsewhere in the State services; or ii a contractor; or iii an employee of an employer who has a contract or other arrangement with the chief executive under which the employee performs work for the benefit of the chief executive and the chief executive is the controlling third party within the meaning given to that term in section 5 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. In Schedule 6, replace clause 8(1) with: 1 The chief executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet must give a long-term insights briefing to the Prime Minister and the Minister at least once in every 3-year period beginning on the commencement date 1 June 2026 and must do so independently of all Ministers. In Schedule 6, repeal clause 8(4). In Schedule 6, repeal clause 8(5). In Schedule 6, clause 8(6), delete by a department or departments . In Schedule 6, clause 8(7), after The , insert Prime . In Schedule 6, after clause 8(7), insert: 8 In subclause (1) , commencement date means the date on which subclause (1) comes into force. In Schedule 6, clause 9(1), replace A chief executive with The chief executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet . In Schedule 6, replace clause 9(1) with: 1 The chief executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet must undertake public consultation on a draft of the long-term insights briefing. In Schedule 6, clause 9(2), replace A chief executive with The chief executive . In Schedule 6, after clause 9, insert: Long-term thinking in policy development 10 Long-term thinking in policy development The chief executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet must issue guidance to other chief executives to— a support long-term thinking in policy development; and b increase the capability of the public service to undertake long-term thinking in policy development. Business continuity management 11 Public service agencies must have business continuity management in place 1 A chief executive of a department or departmental agency, an interdepartmental executive board, or a board of an interdepartmental venture must— a ensure their agency has business continuity management in place that will enable it to deliver its critical functions and services during and after any disruption (including but not limited to an emergency); and b make available to the Commissioner in writing, on request, its plan for functioning during and after a disruption. 2 For the purposes of this section, emergency has the meaning given in section 4 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002. 46 Schedule 7 amended In Schedule 7, clause 3(1), replace clauses 4, 5, and 11 with clause 11 . In Schedule 7, clause 3(4)(a), replace a Deputy Commissioner with Deputy Commissioner . In Schedule 7, replace clause 3(4)(b) with: b the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner (whoever is not also the chairperson), or a public service chief executive, or an employee of the Commission; and In Schedule 7, clause 3(7), delete and diversity and inclusiveness . In Schedule 7, replace clause 3(15)(c) with: c the chairperson must appoint the person and publish in the Gazette without delay— i notice of the Governor-General’s direction under paragraph (a) to appoint the person; and ii notice of the appointment. In Schedule 7, repeal clauses 4 and 5. In Schedule 7, clause 6(1), replace a Deputy Commissioner with the Deputy Commissioner . In Schedule 7, replace clause 9(1)(b) with: b a chief executive is absent from duty (for whatever reason) and— i is unable to delegate their functions, duties, and powers under this Act to another person under clause 2 of Schedule 6; or ii agrees that the Commissioner make the appointment. In Schedule 7, replace clause 9(5) with: 5 The appointment of an acting chief executive ceases on the date on which a chief executive of a department or departmental agency, or a functional chief executive, takes office or returns to duty. In Schedule 7, after clause 9, insert: 9A Performance review framework The Commissioner must— a develop a framework, including the criteria and process, for conducting performance reviews of chief executives; and b consult the Minister on the framework; and c publish the framework on an Internet site maintained by, or on behalf of, the Commission. In Schedule 7, after clause 10(1), insert: 1A The Commissioner must consult, and have regard to any recommendations of, the appropriate Minister when— a setting the performance expectations of a chief executive, including the key performance indicators that the chief executive is expected to meet; and b reviewing the performance of the chief executive under this clause. In Schedule 7, clause 11(1) and (2), delete 4, . 47 Schedule 8 amended In Schedule 8, clause 4(2), delete , temporary, or casual . In Schedule 8, clause 5(2), delete be approved by the Commissioner and must . In Schedule 8, repeal clauses 7 to 11 and the cross-headings above clauses 7 and 8. 48 Principal Act Section 49 amends the Child Poverty Reduction Act 2018. 49 Section 33 amended (Reports: consultation and acting independently) In section 33(3)(a), replace section 52 with section 11A . 50 Principal Act Section 51 amends the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002. 51 Section 58 repealed (Departments and interdepartmental ventures to prepare plans to continue functioning during and after emergency) Repeal section 58. 52 Principal Act Section 53 amends the Crown Pastoral Land Act 1998. 53 Section 22A amended (Chief executive to prepare monitoring framework) In section 22A(1)(a), replace section 52(1)(d) with section 11A(1)(j) . 54 Principal Act Sections 55 and 56 amend the Data and Statistics Act 2022. 55 Section 6 amended (Interpretation) In section 6, replace the definition of Statistician with: Statistician means the Government Statistician appointed under section 12 56 Section 12 amended (Government Statistician) Replace section 12(1) with: 1 A Government Statistician must be appointed by the Public Service Commissioner in accordance with clause 3(2) to (9) of Schedule 7 of the Public Service Act 2020. 1A Clause 3(10) to (15) of that schedule does not apply to the appointment of the Government Statistician. 57 Principal Act Section 58 amends the Education and Training Act 2020. 58 Section 463 amended (Chief Review Officer to perform certain functions) In section 463(1)(a)(ii) and (2)(b), replace section 52 with section 11A . 59 Principal Act Section 60 amends the Employment Relations Act 2000. 60 Section 194 amended (Application for review) In section 194(1), delete and 7 to 11 . 61 Principal Act Section 62 amends the Legislation Act 2019. 62 Section 106 amended (Chief executives must act independently and include statement of responsibility) In section 106(2), replace section 52 with section 11A . 62A Principal Act Section 62B amends the Policing Act 2008. 62B Section 100 replaced (Scope of review by Public Service Commissioner) Replace section 100 with: 100 Scope of review by Public Service Commissioner 1 This section applies if the Public Service Commissioner— a is directed or requested under clause 5 of Schedule 3 of the Public Service Act 2020 to carry out, under section 44(d)(ii) of that Act, a review of the performance of the Police; or b conducts, under clause 5A of Schedule 3 of the Public Service Act 2020, an agency performance improvement review of the Police or a system performance review that includes the Police. 2 The review may relate only to matters referred to in section 16(1) . 63 Principal Act Section 64 amends the Remuneration Authority Act 1977. 64 Schedule 4 amended In Schedule 4, replace Deputy Public Service Commissioners with Deputy Public Service Commissioner . 65 Principal Act Sections 66 and 67 amend the Security Information in Proceedings Act 2022. 66 Section 4 amended (Interpretation) In section 4, definition of classified security information , after paragraph (a), insert: aa clause 5B of Schedule 3 of the Public Service Act 2020: In section 4, definition of security information or SI , after paragraph (a)(ii), insert: iia clause 5B of Schedule 3 of the Public Service Act 2020: 67 Section 29 amended (Application of Part) After section 29(a)(ii), insert: iia clause 5F of Schedule 3 of the Public Service Act 2020: New Part 2 inserted into Schedule 1 2 Provisions relating to Public Service Amendment Act 2025 18 Transition to single Deputy Commissioner 1 In this clause,— Act means the Public Service Amendment Act 2025 commencement date means the date on which section 23 of the Act comes into force. 2 The person who is the longest serving Deputy Commissioner immediately before the commencement date is to be treated as the Deputy Commissioner under this Act on and after the commencement date. 3 The terms and conditions of appointment of that person that applied immediately before the commencement date continue to apply on and after the commencement date unless modified in accordance with the applicable rules and procedures. 4 The role of the Deputy Commissioner who is not the longest serving immediately before the commencement date comes to an end at the close of the day before the commencement date.

Hansard

May 27, 2026

Public Service Amendment Bill — Third Reading · Full day report

Public Service Amendment Bill Third Reading Debate resumed from 26 May 2026. ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): We come to call number six, a split call. Hon JULIE ANNE GENTER (Green—Rongotai) (20:06): Tēnā koe, Mr Speaker. This bill really represents, I think, how polarised and extreme the right-wing parties in New Zealand have become. They are following the route of the Republicans in the United States, a Trump-style MAGA approach, which is really, I think, quite antithetical to what most ordinary New Zealanders—especially those who would have voted for the National Party—expect from politics in New Zealand. We have Andy Foster here talking about how it’s common sense, so if he thinks that Trump and what’s happening in the US—which is the rapid dismantling of democracy in America—is common sense, that’s what voters should pay very close attention to, because this is not the National Party of John Key. Under Luxon, with Deputy Prime Minister David Seymour and New Zealand First well down the rabbit hole of all kinds of Facebook conspiracy theories, we’re seeing the dismantling of democracy in Aotearoa New Zealand. It’s not yet as extreme as what’s happening in America, but, having…
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Public Service Amendment Bill Third Reading Debate resumed from 26 May 2026. ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): We come to call number six, a split call. Hon JULIE ANNE GENTER (Green—Rongotai) (20:06): Tēnā koe, Mr Speaker. This bill really represents, I think, how polarised and extreme the right-wing parties in New Zealand have become. They are following the route of the Republicans in the United States, a Trump-style MAGA approach, which is really, I think, quite antithetical to what most ordinary New Zealanders—especially those who would have voted for the National Party—expect from politics in New Zealand. We have Andy Foster here talking about how it’s common sense, so if he thinks that Trump and what’s happening in the US—which is the rapid dismantling of democracy in America—is common sense, that’s what voters should pay very close attention to, because this is not the National Party of John Key. Under Luxon, with Deputy Prime Minister David Seymour and New Zealand First well down the rabbit hole of all kinds of Facebook conspiracy theories, we’re seeing the dismantling of democracy in Aotearoa New Zealand. It’s not yet as extreme as what’s happening in America, but, having watched that very closely over the last few decades, I can say we are going in that direction very, very quickly, and this bill demonstrates exactly why. While it pretends to have some good objectives—as they always say, “Oh yes,” their little bumper sticker slogans, “We’re fixing the basics and building the future.” I’ve heard that statement in every single speech and every single answer from questions to the National Party, and it’s meaningless nonsense to obscure the fact that they are dismantling democracy. They’re doing that by politicising the Public Service, by making it more privatised, and by trying to cripple the ability of public servants to deliver on the long-term wellbeing and good for our country. That is how extreme. Melissa Lee must remember the relatively moderate John Key Government. Remember the John Key who went and the National Party under his leadership voted to remove section 59 from the Crimes Act? That would never happen today. This National Party, this coalition Government, would buy into silly populist rhetoric and not do the right thing around protecting children. That’s who these people are, and the people at home watching need to know in this election year just how much is at stake. Not only are they politicising and privatising the Public Service by weakening the independence of government; we see it actually with the approach to the Resource Management Act reform, the environment and planning bill. It’s basically Muldoonist style “give control to Ministers”. They’re trying to make it more difficult for the public to have their say so it’s easier for big corporates and the wealthy, vested elite to control the Government for their own purposes. This is what happens—this is how we see the rise of fascism right around the world. It’s not as extreme here, but it is happening. Andy Foster: This is getting ridiculous. Hon JULIE ANNE GENTER: Are you paying any attention to what’s happening in the United States, Andy Foster? Because they have armed thugs wandering the streets and murdering citizens who are standing up for ordinary people. And you are all complicit—the members opposite are complicit in the undermining of the Public Service with this bill. It’s all driven by polarising politics, where they seek to blame the people who are the most marginalised, like they did last week—the New Zealand First Party, who want to harm people— ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): Ms Genter, I think we can come back a little bit closer to the bill. Hon JULIE ANNE GENTER: It is related, Mr Speaker—if you will; if I can get there— ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): Yes, I’m waiting. Hon JULIE ANNE GENTER: What’s happening here is pay equity and inclusion clauses—for example, before, there was a cross-party consensus that we had the Ministry for Women, we had the Ministry for Pacific Peoples, the Ministry for Ethnic Affairs; we cared about trying to address long-term discrimination based on who people were, and they did that through diversity and inclusion policies, which are absolutely, utterly mainstream and considered basic HR practice at the really big corporates, but here we’re removing that from the Public Service, which is one of the largest employers, if not the largest employer, in the country. This is all driven by this weird polarisation where they claim that diversity and being, like, a good employer is somehow a bad thing. The Green Party thinks this is a retrograde step. I think that all the members opposite should think hard about the bills that they have recently voted for. They are buying into “Trumpism”. They are actually very fascist-adjacent. I hope that New Zealanders are going to vote for something better. ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): Tim Costley. Welcome back, Mr Costley. TIM COSTLEY (National—Ōtaki) (20:11): Yeah, nice to see you again, sir. Look, I was going to give a 10-minute speech and talk about what the Human Rights Commission said, where they said that skill, not circumstance, determines opportunity, in regards to the appointment of chief executives. But, actually, I can sum up my whole 10-minute speech in about three seconds. What I wanted to say was the exact opposite of Julie Anne Genter. I commend the bill. LEMAUGA LYDIA SOSENE (Labour—Māngere) (20:11): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I’m very happy to take a call on this terrible, terrible bill: the Public Service Amendment Bill. We oppose this bill. Why do we oppose it? It’s because it is weakening integrity and the capability in the Public Service. Listening to the speech that my colleague served up, it is important for those at home to understand what is at stake. The precious values of the Public Service workers—I want to give and elaborate on a few stories of what this will mean in my local community. In my local community, there are many health workers at our local hospital. Middlemore Hospital is one of the busiest hospitals in the country. It has a huge service, in terms of the emergency department, who operate 24 hours a day. My concern is that those local health workers will be losing their jobs. The other thing is the social workers at our children’s schools, the social workers in Māngere and South Auckland, who provide vital services for the public, members in our community—I want to reflect and pass on my thanks to many of those workers in our local community who provide vital services. I want to reflect on social workers. Social workers in schools and social workers in our community help many of the individuals who are really struggling with the rise of the cost of living in our local communities—those social workers who provide those vital services for members in the community. I’ll give you an example: we have a number of community members in our community who cannot afford things like housing costs, who cannot afford the basic necessities in our local community. The worrying thing is that, when you don’t have a job, when your family relies on you to provide the income, with this Public Service Amendment Bill, they will lose their jobs, because that’s what this Government is promising; they’ve signalled 9,000 Public Service jobs will be gone. What that means for the health workers in our communities is that there will be longer waits. Those support staff in our health services provide vital services, and there is a strong indication from the Government—and we will see that tomorrow—in terms of the vital services the social workers provide. One of the things that I want to thank the social workers for with the homeless problem in Māngere, in South Auckland, is that it is the social workers that have been able to provide those vital services to connect to Government departments, with the Ministry of Social Development, to see what their entitlements are. Kāinga Ora, who provide social housing—without the social workers being able to connect them, there is going to be a real trepidation from our people in the community about who they will be speaking to and who will help them with the basic necessities and basic services. With fewer health workers, one of the things that I am afraid of is the longer wait times. At a time when we are coming into winter, there are a lot of illnesses in our community, and it’s the social workers and the health workers that provide these vital services. What is going to happen when there are those people who are not there, who have provided services in the past? Where is our community going to go to? One of the things with this bill—and why we are strongly opposing it—is that we understand that the Government has made the decision to take those Government funds and support landlords and property speculators, instead of investing more public funds so that people can attain and keep those vital public services. They’re going to disappear; that is our biggest worry. This is not a good bill. It does not provide the services that are needed. We need the commitment from the Government to be better at what they’re supposed to do and provide good jobs. In terms of court staff, it has been indicated that court staff will be losing their jobs. I have been speaking to public officials who are very afraid about this programme that has been signalled by this Public Service Amendment Bill. What is going to happen? Those people are very worried. Who is going to help them with their family bills, with the cost of living crisis, with the fuel crisis? Those things are going to mount up. Can I just refer to the social workers in schools—social workers in schools in Māngere. Speaking to principals, who are very worried about more and more neurodiverse children that are coming into schools, the parents need help; the neurodiverse students need help. With the winding down of professional services, specifically of health services and health workers, that is going to erode those specific services. Where are those families going to go? The worry for principals is that because they’re losing some of their education funding, the qualified teachers they currently have are overloaded with work because of the neurodiverse students that are coming in. There are extra services that are required. You have to go through assessments; you then have to replan your day. The principals are worried that, if there are cuts to these vital services in the Public Service, who is going to assist those specific schools? It’s really important that we help people understand—especially the people listening to us this evening—about the Public Service Amendment Bill, about those Public Service cuts, and the effects and the impacts and what it means for families who are struggling with the cost-of-living crisis. It is important that our people who are going to be making very vital decisions about their voting rights—I do want to remind people that that Government has changed the law, and so people need to understand at home in terms of enrolment and that there will come a time when you have to enrol to get your voter pack. What is important in this discussion is that the Public Service Amendment Bill—the effects and the impacts on communities like mine in Māngere, in South Auckland—people really rely on social workers. I want to keep coming back to the social workers. There are people in my community who are sleeping on Māngere Mountain because they cannot afford social housing. There are elderly women—and I’ve mentioned this in the House before—who are, unfortunately, choosing to stay in bus shelters; that’s a public space. There are also people that are choosing because they don’t have anything. If you erode the Public Service, if you erode social workers, who is going to help those specific individuals? Now, marae and community organisations are reaching out to these individuals, but these individuals are finding it really tough, and they have to make choices they just cannot afford through the cost of living crisis. The other thing that I wanted to mention: with fewer court staff, who do vital work as registrars, as clerks, who prepare a number of things in their roles, that means there will be longer waits through the court process. You’ve got families who will struggle when they have to appear before the magistrate or appear in court. They will be struggling, first of all, with the services. One of the good things that court staff provide is interpretation services. When you have families or individuals that rock up to the court, because English is not their first language, there will be longer wait times in terms of the proceedings. They won’t have the services, and it’ll cause more stress in their local community. I understand that this amendment bill will have a lot of changes: the effects on jobs for Kiwis; more and more people will become unemployed. They’re very, very worried about their current circumstances and how that Government will help them. We will find out more tomorrow when the Government releases its Budget, but I wanted to raise those points in my contribution to really inform people at home who are listening to this debate, who have access to computers, and who can read in terms of the bill, and they need to understand. We oppose this bill. Hon Dr SHANE RETI (National—Whangārei) (20:21): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I think further improving the Public Service towards a high-performing Public Service is a good thing that we all should be interested in. I particularly like the movement in this bill of the appointment of the Chief Statistician from the Public Service Act 2020 to the Data and Statistics Act 2022. I think that will be a good thing. I commend this bill to the House. ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): The Hon Jenny Salesa—five-minute call. Hon JENNY SALESA (Labour—Panmure-Ōtāhuhu) (20:22): Thank you, Mr Speaker, for this opportunity to give a speech on the Public Service Amendment Bill. Labour strongly opposes this bill. I want to be clear about what this bill will do. The Minister for the Public Service and Digitising Government is stripping out every reference to “diversity”, every reference to “equity” and to “inclusion” from the Public Service Act—every single one. The requirement that the Public Service should reflect the community that it serves—that is totally gone. The requirement that the chief executives foster inclusive workplaces—gone. The requirement that remuneration decisions be free from bias—totally gone. Pay equity provisions from the Public Service Act is also gone. The Minister claims that these matters are covered elsewhere, apparently—that it’s covered under the Human Rights Act, the Equal Pay Act,, and the Employment Relations Act—but this argument is disingenuous. Those Acts set the minimum floor for all employers. The law that we’re debating tonight, the Public Service Act—the amendment to the Public Service Act—sets the standard for the Public Service as a model employer, as it should, because the Public Service serves all New Zealanders, and it should reflect all New Zealanders. We are a diverse, multicultural country. We are close to 50 percent in this country of people that are not Pākehā. Our Public Service should reflect that. Removing these provisions sends a devastating signal. It tells tangata whenua Māori, Pacific peoples, women, disabled people, and our ethnic communities that, unfortunately, they are no longer a priority for this Government. It tells public servants from diverse backgrounds that this Government no longer values what they bring, and it tells the agencies themselves that they can deprioritise the work that is to do with diversity, with inclusion, and we do not agree with that. The Minister for the Public Service has admitted that—and I quote; this is the previous Minister—she has not seen examples of people who had been hired into the Public Service for diversity rather than merit reasons, so what problem is being solved here? The answer could lie in the fact that this Government is bringing what is known overseas, in the US, as the “culture war” right here to Aotearoa New Zealand, importing an anti-DEI agenda from the US, and we in the Labour Party utterly reject that. On pay equity, the Public Service has been at the forefront of pay equity in Aotearoa New Zealand since the Government Service Equal Pay Act 1960, so removing pay equity provisions from this Act is not streamlining; it is backwards, and it is regressive. On the myth of meritocracy, the Government tells us that this particular amendment bill is all about merit, but one of the submissions to the select committee, from Te Uru Tāngata, the Centre for Workplace Inclusion, called that out for what it is. They said in their submission, on the myth of meritocracy: they warned the select committee that, without deliberate checks against bias, decision-makers unconsciously lean towards candidates who resemble themselves. The result, in their words—and I quote—is “entrenched homogeneity at the top and a decisive step away from a system that actively works to level the playing field”. That is not merit; that is privilege dressed up in a suit. Now, on the issue of undermining independence, this Government is expanding ministerial influence over chief executive appointments by removing the ability to appoint chief executives, so that every term it becomes contestable and politically charged. Our Public Service is one that should be politically neutral, to be able to serve whichever Government comes in, of whatever stripes. We totally reject this bill. KATIE NIMON (National—Napier) (20:27): It’s a pleasure to speak to this bill in the House. Look, there’s nothing that niggles me more than mission creep, so it’s great to see a tightening up of the Public Service and what it is there to do for the public in serving it. So, with that, I commend this bill to the House. Hon JAN TINETTI (Labour) (20:27): Thank you, Mr Speaker. This is an incredibly regressive piece of legislation, and it’s very disappointing to see that the other side can’t even give it what it deserves and speak to what they believe is going to strengthen the Public Service through this bill. One of the reasons they can’t do that this evening is because it doesn’t strengthen the Public Service. It absolutely weakens what has always been such a pride of our political system in this country. The Public Service has always had the premise that they are required to serve the long-term public interest. Unfortunately, that has been taken away and weakened within this. In fact, we’re seeing, rather, a politicisation of the Public Service through what is happening here. My colleague the Hon Jenny Salesa talked about some of the real attacks this bill has that make it an absolutely shocking piece of legislation when you really look at the nub of what it’s trying to achieve here. One of those is the absolute attack this bill has on diversity, equity, and inclusion. Removing those explicit duties to promote those areas that has made the Public Service in the past look like and feel like the community it serves is simply really upsetting, and ensuring that the community that it serves is not going to see themselves represented is, what I’ve said already, a completely regressive step. It is important that those communities who need the Public Service to better their lives and need to see policies being enacted by those Public Service people see those people that represent and look like them. In the past—and my colleague the Hon Jenny Salesa, as I said, has explained that really well—biases do exist in appointments. Unless you shine a light on what should happen in the appointment process, biases will be there, whether they’re conscious or unconscious—I’m not going to deliberately call them “unconscious”, because I do sometimes think there are conscious biases that exist as well—and unless you legislate that that is going to be addressed, they will continue to happen and we will go backwards. We will see a Public Service that will look more like the people that are making those appointments, and that is really worrying. The other area that I find incredibly disappointing—incredibly disappointing—is the undermining of pay equity. The Public Service has long held pay equity up as a value, even, I’m going to say, a value that is incredibly important. When they had targets put upon them and a light was shone on the pay gaps that existed within the Public Service, those started to change for the better. In fact, when we as a country started to really look at pay equity and pay gaps and started to work on pay gap reporting, it was important that the Government got its own house in order first, which is why the first emphasis was put on the Public Service for having targets to reduce those pay gaps. Wow, what a difference they made. By shining a light, those pay gaps reduced dramatically, and that led the way for what was happening in the private sector. Taking that away and undermining that is going to see a difference the other way. We’re going to see a negative difference happening here because, again, those areas have not been fully addressed. We haven’t got to zero. We have not seen the pay gaps completely being taken away, and while they exist, while even a small pay gap exists, there is more work to do. Unfortunately, this bill does not address that more work that is needed. It’s painful. It is incredibly painful, because it is another act— Grant McCallum: Are you talking about your speech? Hon JAN TINETTI: —that this Government—and here we go. We’ve got them going on the other side without even listening to the argument or the debate. We have this Government once again hitting women. That is just about almost a year after they took a successful pay equity system away from women in this country. They are now doing it through this bill, the Public Service Amendment Bill. Women see this. Women are seeing that this Government is not having their backs, is not sticking up for them, is not sticking up for pay equity within the whole of the system within the country. They will tell the Government that. They will absolutely tell the Government that. One of the areas that Ministers and the executive rely on very much is the long-term insights briefings. They make a big difference across what is happening in Government. They enable Ministers to make decisions about whether aspects of their programmes are working, whether the other areas of Government are influencing those areas. This bill is minimising those long-term insights briefings, and I think that is incredibly disappointing for what is happening in our evaluations of our programmes in this country. I fail to see how the politicisations of the Public Service and the taking away of the long-term insights briefings, in the way that this bill does this, is going to improve ministerial and executive decision-making, because it won’t. It means that the executive have more of an excessive influence without that neutrality of the Public Service and without that neutrality of evaluation that the Public Service provides. That is something that I think New Zealanders should be really concerned about. They should absolutely be incredibly concerned that we’re losing that neutrality through this particular amendment bill, and we are losing the valid and valuable information that the Public Service provides in a very neutral way to ensure that Ministers and the executive can be really confident in the decisions that they are making for the betterment of this country. I’ve only just come on to the Governance and Administration Committee in the last few months, but when I looked into this bill and saw that, as the bill was being put together by this Government, there had been a lack of consultation with the people who really make a difference and work within the Public Service and the people that support the Public Service, I found that was also of real concern. It would not be a normal position for that to happen. Normally, we would see that, when the Government was putting a bill together like this, there would be an opportunity to look at how we can improve and strengthen the Public Service, with those people at the table to be able to help form that policy. Well, that didn’t happen in this case. That means that we’ve had a missed opportunity for positive reform. This is not positive reform. This is a regressive step in the history of the Public Service of our country. There is a potential overreach in the performance management. We have an erosion of stewardship. We’ve got an attack on diversity and equity and inclusion. We’re undermining pay equity. There is a risk to independence of appointments. There are merit-based appointment concerns, and the values of the public trust are hugely at stake with this piece of legislation. We on this side of the House value our Public Service. We don’t see that this bill does that, and therefore, we do not agree with this bill. Hon MELISSA LEE (National) (20:37): Thank you very much, Mr Speaker. When 30 percent of public servants don’t actually believe that the people who are appointed in their organisations are appointed on merit, you have a problem in the Public Service. You can’t have a high-performing Public Service without the right people, so merit-based appointments are essential and crucial. That is one of the things that I really love about this bill. I commend it to the House. ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): Oriini Kaipara—five minutes. ORIINI KAIPARA (Te Pāti Māori—Tāmaki Makaurau) (20:38): Mr Speaker, tēnā koe. Look, this bill is ridiculous. I mean, this Government is trying to modernise the Public Service by removing the public from it. The first clue is in clause 10 of this bill. The Government wants to remove the phrase “facilitates active citizenship” from the purpose of the Public Service Act. A Public Service Act that no longer thinks about helping the public participate in democracy as part of the Public Service—that’s extraordinary arrogance. Apparently, New Zealanders are now expected to sit quietly while Ministers and consultants decide what is best for everybody else. Consultation is inconvenient when communities disagree with Ministers. Active citizenship becomes inconvenient when people challenge those powers, and Māori voices are inconvenient when they refuse to quietly disappear into the background of somebody else’s version of New Zealand’s history. Then we hear all this talk about merit-based appointments, as if Māori, as if wāhine, as if Pasifika, and our diverse communities somehow wandered into senior roles by accident. Please—there is no evidence that the Public Service stopped appointing capable people. What changed was that the Public Service finally started recognising that competence in Aotearoa includes understanding the people you serve. Apparently, that became too woke for this coalition Government, and now they want to strip diversity obligations while pretending that this is all about neutrality. But there is nothing neutral about removing the very tools designed to make the Public Service reflect the public. That is not neutrality. That there is ideological landscaping, with a Crown logo slapped on it, and the hypocrisy gets even worse when we look at the honourable Minister David Seymour. This man is constantly lecturing the whole country about cutting bureaucracy and about reducing Wellington bloat and trimming Government spending, and yet, according to Rachel Pannett from BusinessDesk, Mr Seymour was calling for “less Wellington bloat, fewer government departments, and less government spending” in the very same week—the very same week—that his Ministry for Regulation grew to more than four times the size of the agency that it replaced. Steve Abel: Hypocrites. ORIINI KAIPARA: Four staff became 18. At this rate, the “Ministry for Reducing Bureaucracy” is going to need its own bureaucracy just to explain the bureaucracy. You cannot— Cameron Luxton: Point of order, Mr Speaker. Thank you, Mr Speaker. I believe that a word starting with “h” which is well and truly out of bounds for use in this House was used from that side of the House. I’d ask you to take note of that and perhaps ask who may have done that and then ask for an apology. ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): I did hear that. It was actually not directed at the individual; it wasn’t directly enough for me to intervene. What I will say, though, is that when the member is reading her speech, there’s less provision, because it means you’ve had time to think about it, rather than if it’s coming from the heart, and so the member might just like to get a little bit further away from the notes—but bearing that in mind. Thank you. Steve Abel: Mr Speaker, can I just seek clarification? ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): Yes. Are you speaking to the point of order? Steve Abel: Well, if you’ve already ruled on that, then perhaps I need to make another point of order. I would like to speak to the point of order, if I may. ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): Be very direct towards it. Steve Abel: I believe that Mr Luxton was referring to my interjection— ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): No, he was referring to the content of the speech. Steve Abel: Oh, apologies. ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): Certainly, I was ruling on the content of the speech. Cameron Luxton: I think—thank you, Mr Speaker. Just continuing that point of order, if I may. Yes, it was towards the interjection by the member who has stood up and laid it up— ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): Oh, OK. Right, can I just say— Cameron Luxton: —but there are words that we can’t use in this House, which I heard used. ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): —enough “he said, I said”. Cameron Luxton: Yeah, sure. ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): What I’ll say is: did the member directly accuse David Seymour of being a hypocrite? Steve Abel: Mr Speaker— ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): Did you—yes or no? Steve Abel: I said “hypocrites”, meaning the Government— ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): No, no, I’m asking you a question. Have you accused— Steve Abel: No, I did not—no. ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): OK, if you say you didn’t, as an honourable member, I’ll take your word for it. Steve Abel: Thank you. ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): Carry on with the speech, please. ORIINI KAIPARA: Tēnā koe. While this Government preaches efficiency, communities like ours know exactly what those words usually mean, and that means cuts: cuts to services, cuts to community voices, cuts to Māori providers, cuts dressed up in accountant language and sold back to struggling whānau as fiscal responsibility. Then we arrive at the long-term insights briefing. The Government says that consultation takes too long and costs too much money—well, yes: democracy is slower than dictatorship. Listening to people will always take longer than ignoring them, but what an astonishing message it is to send to Aotearoa that hearing from communities about the future of their own country is now considered administrative waste—especially our Māori communities, who have spent generations fighting just to be heard in the first place. Despite all the spin, New Zealanders saw through this bill immediately—immediately. Seventy-two percent of submissions opposed it—72 percent. It’s not a made-up figure. Most Governments would treat that as a warning sign, but this coalition has treated it like a minor inconvenience, because this bill is not really about modernising the Public Service; it’s about reshaping it in the ideological image of this Government, which is less participation, less diversity, less Treaty responsibility, and more centralised control. A truly modern Public Service would strengthen democracy, I agree. It would deepen Te Tiriti o Waitangi and the partnerships that are promised, and it would reflect the people that it serves. Instead, this Government is trying to whitewash both history and legislation while calling it reform. We oppose this. A party vote was called for on the question, That the Public Service Amendment Bill be now read a third time. Ayes 67 New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8. Noes 55 New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi. Motion agreed to. Bill read a third time. ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Greg O'Connor): Just before I call on the next bill, I am just reflecting on that last interchange around the word “hypocrite”. Members, please avoid using it. It is a well-defined word that is a no-no in the House, and trying to work out where it is directed is not always the easiest, especially when it’s hard to hear it from the Chair. So can I just, again, reiterate to members: avoid the use of that word. It’s a big, wide language—the English one—and I’m sure, with a little work, you can find a better one.

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